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HISTORICAL ASPECTS  
OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION  
IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
 
 
 
Different political elite groups of post-
communist Lithuania offer different accounts 
of the Soviet past. Even twenty years later, 
after the collapse of communism Lithuanian 
politicians (with the exception of certain 
conservative anti-nostalgic leaders allied 
with some populists) still do not have a uni-
fied and coherent view on the Soviet political 
and social practices, truths, and methods. 
However, conservatives are very consistent in 
their restrictive views about the past and are 
willing to engage in propagating decision-
making that prevents them from repeating the 
actions of the past. Social democrats, liber-
als, and populists are much more internally 
divided and tend to display lukewarm atti-
tudes towards the Soviet past and its political 
reconsideration. Yet, the present analysis of 
the adopted laws and public policies, along-
side a study on the attitudes of political elites 
make it possible to conclude that anti-nostal-
gia, the negative assessment of the Soviet life-
style, criticism of it and attempts to keep the 
former Soviet decision makers out of Lithua-
nia’s public administration are key ways of 
treating the past in Lithuania. All efforts to 
accommodate a more permissive attitude 
towards the Soviet past and civil servants 
whose career began under the Soviets do not 
find much support within the Lithuanian elite. 
 
Key words: political elite, memory, anti-
nostalgia, collective identity, Soviet past 
 
1. Introduction:  
political action and memory 
 
Memory has become an increasingly 
important analytical category for histori-
ans, sociologists, cultural theorists, mar-
keting managers, and political scientists. 
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The narrative and representation, two major building blocks of memory, 
yield ample interpretations and insights about elite’s and popular culture, 
provide agency to ordinary people and political leadership when it comes to 
understanding the past and projecting the future, contribute to the structuring 
of social identities and expand the public spheres trans-nationally. 
Scholars have variously sought to explain the rise of interest in the past, 
memory, commemoration, and nostalgia in contexts ranging from consumer 
promotion, popular culture, interior and exterior design as well as the rise of 
compensations, apologies, and other forms of redress in domestic and inter-
national politics. Answers have included the decline of the nation-state as a 
carrier of collective identity, the end of faith in progress, the rise of multicul-
turalism, and post-modernity in general. 
Some intellectuals have gone so far as to claim that memory is the new 
paradigm of history, overpowering and restructuring other frames of refer-
ence like class and gender [17]. The fall of communism and its ensuing so-
cial transformations are major historical events that further increased politi-
cal and intellectual interest in the studies of memory. In post-communist 
Europe, of which Lithuania is a part, the complexity of the present-day situa-
tion, as well as its success, promises, disappointments, and hopes makes 
people rethink the recent past. Consequently, political elites in the region 
tend to address the issue of memory. Democratic regimes respect freedom of 
consciousness, speech and association as well as uphold the principle of free 
and fair elections. By doing so they create conditions that are essential for 
the emergence of historical memories that are analytically distinguishable 
from ideology, propaganda, and half-truths. 
Historical memory is a form of social memory in which a group con-
structs a selective representation of its own imagined past. Historical mem-
ory may legitimate or challenge the status quo, teach a lesson, validate a 
claim, consolidate an identity, or inspire action — that is, it typically has a 
social or political purpose. It is important to emphasize that in any society 
there is no single historical or collective memory, but rather there are as 
many stories and feelings about the past as there are social or political 
groups vying for power. 
Therefore the researcher‘s interest should encompass the actors and practi-
cal uses to which elements of the past can be put for current political ends. As 
Heisler forcefully argues, ‘the current politics of the past deals with history, 
engages memory, and may invoke aspects of identity, but, in fact, it is a practi-
cal matter that unfolds in the present’ [5, p. 201]. In a similar vein, Kratochwil 
in the Machiavellian tradition eloquently states that the ‘politics is inherently 
practical since it deals with doing the right thing at the right time in view of 
the particular historical circumstances’ [6, p. 6]. Heisler concludes that the 
researcher‘s task is ‘less the determination of the bases in history of the attacks 
on particular positions, or which constructions of the memories of particular 
actions or events should prevail, than of the practical uses to which elements 
of the past can be put for current political ends’ [5, p. 201]. 
Historical memories related to national or cultural trauma is a particular 
battlefield for members and non-members of imagined communities [for 
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instance, in the early 1990s American Lithuanians were very active in de-
monizing Soviet nomenklatura], high- and low-status groups, and holders of 
a particular value orientation or political identity and their detractors. Smel-
ser defines cultural trauma as a memory accepted and publicly given cre-
dence by a relevant membership group and evoking an event or situation that 
is laden with negative affect, represented as indelible, and regarded as 
threatening a society’s existence or violating one or more of its fundamental 
cultural presuppositions [11]. In order to be overcome, cultural trauma must 
be ‘understood, explained and made coherent through public reflection and 
discourse’ [4, p. 2]. The cultural trauma in question is the 50-year long So-
viet occupation of Lithuania. 
Past cultural traumas might lead to positive and ethically constitutive 
stories that are more likely to integrate collectivities. Such narratives and the 
institutional arrangements, which support them, evolve over time, reflecting 
changing social, economic, political, and other conditions or the political 
exigencies. The updating, re-loading or revising of the narratives and institu-
tional arrangements related to the management of the past are most com-
monly elite-driven. Formal and unofficial political leaders are important in 
the construction and reconstruction of ethically constitutive messages; in 
fact, they are political leaders in part because of their roles in articulating 
such responses [12, p. 42—43]. 
Political elites in this enterprise, however, meet an unpleasant challenge: 
the frequent need to integrate morally repugnant chapters from the past. It 
appears that most people would be more strongly motivated, rather than alien-
ated, if they saw their political identities as partly constituted by histories dis-
playing both good and bad elements [12, p. 160]. However, such positive atti-
tudes towards lessons of the past are not at all self-evident. After all, there is 
no guarantee that former Soviet collaborators and passive bystanders, whose 
tacit complicity made the Soviet system possible, in the post-communist cir-
cumstances would be able to resist the temptation to have a comfortable career 
at the expense of, once again, damaging the society by the weakness of their 
own moral views. Bauman warns that awareness of the Evil, the knowledge 
that the unimaginable is possible, seems to have made the Evil more, rather 
than less likely [1]. In post-communist societies, hypocrisy is rampant, and 
lying (if silence is impossible) proves to be the most rational way of dealing 
with unpleasant facts. Paradoxically, positive self-concepts can be maintained 
in the face of betrayals of the principles on which they are based. Elites lie in 
their attempts to sustain the belief that they are virtuous in the minds of those 
they lead; as a result, they lie ‘not only to others but also to themselves, with 
their everyday evasions, and the veil they draw over the more ugly features of 
the world they have made’ [16, p. 42]. 
In this study, we look at how the conflict-laden past is used in public 
discourse and in political competition in Lithuania during more than 
twenty years after the breakdown of the Soviet rule. We mainly examine 
rhetorical use of the past. The study of the institutional arrangements de-
signed to bring some order to the study of memory and the analysis the 
attitudes of parliamentary candidates (2008) show that political projects 
I. Matonyte 
 89
related to the Soviet past constitute an important part of the political capital 
of those who aspire to legislative office. Indeed, in the Lithuanian politics, 
the growing distance from the Soviet times (laden with the cultural trauma) 
does not diminish the scope and the depth of the political saliency of the 
Soviet past. Rather, the time factor is important in another (cyclical) man-
ner: the issues of the Soviet past compellingly re-emerge in the public do-
main during electoral campaigns. 
It happens because an electoral campaign in democracies is a high sea-
son in the continuum of the process of political communication, occasionally 
challenged by other events, worth of increased political mobilization, public 
interest and media coverage. It is widely argued that the success of any elec-
toral campaign depends on the mobilization effect, which it generates. Po-
litical mobilization techniques, themes and traps are very important in the 
Lithuanian politics: for instance, public opinion polls show that more than 
one third of voters in Lithuania make their voting decisions during the elec-
toral campaign [20]. Longitudinal data also show that the share of the 
Lithuanian voters who decide about their electoral choice during the cam-
paign is increasing over years of the democratic elections [13, p. 15]. 
 
2. Four patterns of discourse about the Soviet past in Lithuania 
 
Individual and group memories, like individual and group identities, are 
products of active creation, not passive inheritance; through selective re-
membering and forgetting, people construct out of the randomness and 
fragmentation of human experience comprehensible stories in which past 
events cumulatively determine present existence and provide signposts to 
guide future action [2]. In terms of discursive practices, Velikonja proposed 
a four-fold typology of how people in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
today see and deal with their decades under communism [15]. 
The first way of dealing with that troubled past is renunciation — anti-
nostalgia. In Lithuania (and in most of CEE) the dominant public discourse 
completely blacks out the communist time. New ideologies of nationalism, 
liberalism, conservatism are created and developed on the basis of a com-
plete condemnation of everything related to the Soviet period. A quantitative 
topographic discourse analysis, based on codified data from the Lithuanian 
Language Dictionary (which includes texts published in 1994—2003 and 
contains more than 1000 million words) reveals that some nostalgic notions 
(such as communist model, return to the past, good old times, Soviet system) 
occur only in Lithuanian belles-lettres and the mass-media and are mostly 
associated with humoristic positions [7, p. 406]. 
Anti-nostalgic political attitudes are pro-active and are aimed at combat-
ing conformism and the passive escapism of people who cannot (or do not 
want to) adapt to new conditions, but prefer to live in a prolonged yesterday. 
There are many public policy instruments adopted in post-communist 
Lithuania that cater to an anti-nostalgic mood. In the early 1990s, the 
Lithuanian Seimas adopted several legislative acts, pertinent to retroactive 
and transitional justice, such as the law on restitution of real-estate, the lus-
Historical aspects of international cooperation in the Baltic Sea region 
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tration law which banned former collaborators of the Soviet secret services 
from high-ranking positions in public service and in the educational system 
of independent Lithuania1; the amendments to the electoral law requiring 
candidates to inform voters about their past collaboration with the KGB; the 
law on compensation of damage resulting from the USSR occupation was 
adopted on 13 June 20002, etc. 
From its very inception in the early 1990s, the Center for Resistance and 
Genocide Studies has contributed much to forging anti-nostalgic moods in 
Lithuania (long-time director of the Center, historian Dalia Kuodyte, served 
her first mandate in the Lithuanian Seimas during 2008—2012 as a member 
of Sąjūdis and was running for re-election in 2012). Through its publica-
tions, conferences and public statements, notions of victimization, traumatiz-
ing history, psychology of transference, etc. have been introduced into the 
Lithuanian academic and public discourses. 
The second way to deal with the Soviet past is amnesia that imposes si-
lence about everything that happened before the breakdown of the Soviet rule. 
Public discourse in CEE commonly displays metaphors related to this, such as 
the spring of nations, democratic awakening, (belated) Europeanization, the 
new start, etc. The emerging social-democratic discourse in CEE frequently 
uses this strategy of amnesia in its attempts to avoid the stigma attached to the 
communist regime, which allegedly espoused a radical version of social-de-
mocratic values. Amnesia tactic is also embraced by many aspirants to po-
litical power across the entire political spectrum in CEE: many ambitious peo-
                                                     
1 The Lustration commission in Lithuania has been created in the early 90s and func-
tioned as defined in art. 4 of the Lustration Law, forbidding former KGB collabora-
tors to have decision making positions in public service and educational sphere (ac-
tual version of the Law is adopted in 1999). The Commission was composed of 5 
persons (1 delegated by the State Procurator, 2 delegated by the Department of State 
Security and 2 delegated by the Center of genocide and resistance studies), its com-
position was approved in the Seimas, it was accountable to the Director of the De-
partment of State Security, it functioned as a public interest organization (its mem-
bers were not paid) and it supervised the implementation of the Lustration Law, i. e. 
represented the State in court trials, when anybody challenged the fact of his/her 
former collaboration with the Soviet security services. The Commission was dis-
banded in 2010, since the moratorium period established by law expired in 2009. 
2 It is quite natural that the Lithuanian conservatives (in charge of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of the governmental coalition) in the early stages of the 2012 
parliamentary electoral campaign renewed the diplomatic efforts, aimed at 
implementation of this particular law. It follows from the preamble of the law that 
under Lithuanian constitutional law no state organ or official can declare a waiver of 
the claim for Russia’s responsibility because the law is based on and aims at 
implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national 
referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore 
the waiver can be declared only by other referendum. To keep the claim for 
responsibility of another state admissible and valid, when it is being unresolved a 
long time, the injured state should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the 
claim. Therefore, the law obliged the government to seek constantly the 
compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. [18, p. 52—53]. 
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ple are in one way or another touched by the previous communist regime and 
therefore omissions in one’s personal biography might help diminish the po-
litical vulnerability of the candidate and promote them to a decision-making 
position [8]. Evidently, in the context of the dominant anti-nostalgic pattern 
that prevails in the region, amnesia is not relevant to dissident activities or 
other anti-Soviet engagement. However, given the tremendous differences in 
shares of what is to be forgotten (collaboration in the Soviet times) and what is 
to be glorified (anti—Soviet resistance), tensions related to historical memory 
and reconciliation in Lithuania are big and chances to knowingly overcome 
some touchy elements in personal biographies of political aspirants are mini-
mal (in her 2009 electoral campaign, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite 
unsuccessfully used the strategy of amnesia in relation to her studies of politi-
cal economy in Leningrad in the 1970s and her career in the Vilnius Higher 
Party School in the 1980s). 
The third method used by the post-communist societies to deal with 
their past is historical revisionism, which is, on the one hand, a reinterpre-
tation of the Soviet past as something completely alien to CEE (and Rus-
sia) or, on the other hand, revealing the positive contributions of the Soviet 
system to the formerly agrarian societies of the region. One group of revi-
sionists claims that Soviet rule and the Soviet system were merely imposed 
by a handful of (local) Bolsheviks, whose power was based on the use of 
terror and repression against the majority of the population, or — as in the 
case of Baltic countries — was established as a result of an international 
conspiracy (they refer to the secret protocols of the 1939 Soviet-German 
non-aggression agreement3). 
Another group of revisionists tries to justify the pro-Soviet engagement 
by the generation of individuals born in the 1940—50s, who did not have 
any other options for having a full social life aside from teaming up with the 
handful of devoted communists sent by Moscow to supervise and impose the 
Soviet regime in their country. 
Finally, the fourth approach to the Soviet past is nostalgia, an uncritical 
glorification of those Soviet times and experiences no matter what they were 
reall like. Nostalgic moods in CEE have been reflected in sociological survey 
data since the very beginning of the post-communist transition. The 1992 par-
liamentary elections in Lithuania were a great surprise: they put former com-
munists back in power. Sociologist Gaidys showed that the political prefer-
ences of Lithuanian voters can be reasonably well predicted by the level of 
their appreciation (or apprehension) of Soviet times: people who think that 
‘Life was better under the Soviets’ score significantly higher on their inten-
sions to vote for the ex-communist party (social democrats) than those who 
disagree with this statement and intend to vote for nationalist, liberal or con-
servative parties [3]. However, as alluded to above, in Lithuania the social-
democratic party espouses rather anti-nostalgic or amnesiac patterns of collec-
tive memory in its public stances, and therefore the mass public’s association 
of this party with Soviet nostalgia is even more extraordinary. 
                                                     
3 I. e. the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. 
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In order to accurately capture the paradox of popular Soviet nostalgia we 
should bear in mind that none of the Lithuanian parties or individual politi-
cians explicitly refer to Soviet nostalgia in their attempts to win electoral 
support. However, in a series of qualitative interviews and public opinion 
surveys, political scientist Ramonaite demonstrated that the Lithuanian peo-
ple (irrespective of their social position) who feel some nostalgia for the 
Soviet times tend to favor pragmatist versus normative politics [10[. They 
also take less of a moralistic stance towards politicians and civil servants. 
Nostalgic Lithuanians are distinctive in terms of their party preferences, but 
they do not necessarily favor the ex-communist social democrats; they also 
like populist parties [10, p. 101]. In short, nostalgic people are concentrated 
among the most socially vulnerable groups. Their nostalgia is in fact a retro-
spective utopia, a wish and a hope for a safe world, a fair society, and well-
being in general. Soviet nostalgia as such proves to be not so much an ideo-
logical effort to celebrate the Soviet past as it was, but rather an amorphous 
wish to transcend the (difficult) present. 
Meanwhile, this bottom-up nostalgic culture because of its strong affective 
appeal is widely used in the culture industries, aiming to open new commercial 
niches, to win popular support, to get artistic inspiration, and so on [14]. 
It is worthwhile to underline that the new discipline of visual studies ex-
pands the notion of discourse to include the public sphere where the issues 
are not only pronounced and deliberated, but also where they are displayed 
visually and invite to experience them with their aesthetic, psychological, 
affective effects. The ability to render the world visible and invisible is a 
concrete form of power. With its law forbidden use of Soviet symbols in 
public space, Lithuania is the only post-communist country trying to trim 
down the visual scope of its culture of nostalgia by overtly political means. 
The Lithuanian civil code bans the public display of Soviet (and Nazi) sym-
bols and prohibits their sale, except for as antiquarian items. 
To sum up, versions of the Soviet past that emerge in public discourse, 
social practices, and cultural heritage, and the extent it does, depends on 
many factors and tells us much about the constitution and tendencies of 
Lithuanian society. At any rate, memories of the Soviet period provide 
agency to ordinary people and even more so to political elites, whose differ-
ent ways of interpreting the past continuously re-establish themselves and 
interact with one another. 
 
3. Political elites and lack of ideological coherece 
 
The previous section amply demonstrates that Lithuanian elites are very 
much aware of the fact that memory is a source of political contestation. 
Political leadership thrives on discursive and institutional opportunities to 
reshape or renegotiate the recent past. Therefore, it is only natural that the 
discussion of memory might become a forum for particularly intensive and 
noticeably structured political contestation. 
Our inquiry into patterns of political debates related to political man-
agement of the Soviet past is based on the data from the Lithuanian web-site 
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www. manobalsas. lt, which was developed on the basis of a similar study in 
Switzerland (www. smarvote. ch). The web-site has been since 2007 and 
offers on-line questionnaires to anyone who wanted to check the proximity 
of their views to their desired party representative. The questionnaires are 
separately presented for each election (to the Seimas in 2008, to the Euro-
pean Parliament in 2009, for President of Lithuania in 2009, and to the Par-
liament in 2012). The questionnaire uses a scale to identify to what extent 
the respondent agrees (or does not agree) with a certain way of managing 
historical memory (4 — strongly agree; 3 — somewhat agree; 2 — some-
what disagree; 1 — strongly disagree) [9]. Let us focus on the attitude of 
elites to the Soviet past: the former KGB employees and reservists, the ban 
on Soviet symbols, and open access to the KGB archives4. It is worth noting 
that the issue about the KGB reservists (the fact of their inclusion on election 
lists) was the most urgent (politically sensitive) in the course of the 
2012 campaign. The research shows that political candidates have strong 
opinions about issues related to the political interpretation of the Soviet past. 
The most numerous ‘no opinion’ responses (11 out of 333) were on the ques-
tion about banning the Soviet symbols. The other three questions generated 
only 2—4 ‘no opinions’ each. The obtained data show that conservative5 
candidates advocate the most restraining and condemnatory attitudes to-
wards the Soviet past and definitively support the strict preventive political 
management of collective memories. 
In the second place to the conservatives on a broadly restrictive position 
is the populist camp6 (in 2008 parties TT and TPP, in 2012 the activists of 
the former TPP are running with liberals). Yet, highly restrictive views to-
wards the Soviet past are not espoused by the representatives of the anchor 
party (DP) of the camp of Lithuanian populists. The representatives of the 
DP diverge strongly among themselves and therefore the party as a group 
converges to zero in its attitudes on the memory items. Somewhat unexpect-
                                                     
4 The questions were as follows: 
1. Do you agree that there must be certain restrictions on employment in civil 
service and education for individuals who previously collaborated with the Soviet 
secret services? [A law on this was adopted in 1990]. 
2. Do you agree that former KGB reservists should be banned from holding im-
portant decision-making positions in the state? [In 2007 there were several initia-
tives for passing such a law; however, each one failed to garner a parliamentary 
majority].  
3. Do you approve of the ban on Soviet symbols? [A law on this was adopted in 
2008]. 
4. Do you agree that the archives of the Soviet secret services should be made be 
accessible without any restrictions? 
5Conservatives TS-LKD+ [this party group label includes candidates from Home-
land Union/Lithuanian Christian Democrats TS-LKD, Lithuanian Center Party LCP, 
and the nationalist party “Young Lithuania” JL; in 2008 N= 75]. 
6 Populists DP+, TPP and TT [this party group label includes candidates from the 
Labor Party and Labor Youths Party DP+, the National Revival Party TPP, and the 
party “Order and Justice” TTP; in 2008 N= 67]. 
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edly, it appears that a big part of the populist politicians in Lithuania are very 
consistent in their restrictive attitudes towards both, general bans and blam-
ing the Soviet era, as well as lustration of former Soviet collaborators. 
The social-democrats7 are concentrated on the lower end of the scale of 
all four memory issues. Yet the social-democrats also display very lukewarm 
attitudes, as they rarely take strong positions and are not strongly opposed to 
the lustration of former Soviet collaborators, the opening of Soviet archives, 
and bans on the public display of Soviet symbols. Interestingly, the passing 
away of long-time leader of Lithuanian social-democrats, former First Secre-
tary of the Communist Party in Soviet Lithuania, Algirdas Brazauskas 
(1932—2010) did not produce any major revisions in the lukewarm attitudes 
towards the Soviet past of the social-democratic elites campaigning in 2012. 
The liberals8 are similarly lukewarm in their support of restrictive meas-
ures related to the past and rarely display strong opinions on any of the se-
lected issues. The liberals are much less dichotomously structured than ex-
pected in their attitude towards the ban on the use of Soviet symbols. To 
some extent, in their tepid views on this issue, they show their disapproval of 
the existing law. In that respect, the Lithuanian liberals come close to the 
lukewarm social-democrats. 
The candidates of another marginal party (NS) were the only ones to 
have strong (negative) opinions on all four selected issues in 2008. Their 
subsequent electoral failure in 2008 might be (partially) explained by their 
strong (permissive, amnesiac) stances towards the Soviet past, as this posi-
tion in the field of memory is seemingly unattractive to Lithuanian voters. It 
is quite indicative that in 2012 the NS merged with the liberals and started to 
present ‘no opinion’ on the memory related issues. 
To sum up, in 2008 and in 2012 there were (and there still are) some dis-
cernible party-related patterns that one can observe in the distribution of 
politicians’ attitudes towards the past and its residues in contemporary 
Lithuanian politics. The conservatives and some Lithuanian populists ex-
press rather coherent anti-nostalgic stances. On the other extreme, amnesiac 
attitudes are exceptionally marginal. Yet, other political parties in Lithuania 
are not that clearly structured either ideologically or discursively. The social-
democrats and liberals have lukewarm views on issues of memory. The lib-
erals display a slightly conservative (anti-nostalgic) bias but do not support 
such strong as banning the public display of Soviet symbols. Neither liberals 
nor social-democrats in Lithuania display an unprincipled permissiveness 
(historical revisionism) or broad-minded approach (amnesia) towards the 
Soviet past. The dominant line of the social-democrats’ reasoning reflects 
their belief in the salutary political and social reconciliation of different 
                                                     
7 Social-democrats LSDP+ [this party group label includes candidates from the 
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party LSDP, Political party “Frontas,” and Lithuanian 
Social Democratic Union LSP; in 2008 N= 53]. 
8 Liberals LiCS+LRLS [this party group label includes candidates from the Liberal 
Movement of the Republic of Lithuania LRLS, and Liberal and Centre Union LiCS; 
in 2008 N= 77]. 
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groups with their complex past and with their troubled approaches to the 
Soviet regime. Liberals tend to place the accent on the passage of time and 
believe that specially-enacted restrictive laws will eventually become obso-
lete. The Lithuanian populists bifurcate into two groups. One group, in 
proper populist manner, reflects the real pot-pourri of attitudes related to 
Soviet symbols and KBG archives and laws concerning KGB collaborators 
and reservists. However, there are very few populists who overtly stand 
against banning Soviet (and Nazi) symbols and against opening the secret 
archives for public access. In conservative manner, many populist politicians 
consider legal restrictions taken against former collaborators with the Soviet 
regime to be necessary and appropriate. 
On the one hand, post-communist Lithuanian elites are rather strict when 
issuing verdicts of guilty and punishing individuals (and by doing so, they 
diminish the chances to impersonally distribute guilt across the entire soci-
ety). Even Lithuanian liberals do not have much difficulty translating the 
discourse of lustration into laws, of retroactive justice which bases its legiti-
macy upon moral and ethical arguments and proceeds from an illiberal pre-
sumption of guilt. 
On the other hand, Lithuanian elites are sensitive to the visualization9 
and objectification of the Soviet experiences and memories. The elites try to 
rationally and convincingly educate and inform people about the Soviet past 
and to limit other sources of possible social learning that are less easy to 
control (because they relate to aesthetics and play upon affect and senti-
ments, as well as on collective imaginary and myths). 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Memory is not located in the mind of individual actors, but rather it ex-
ists in the public discourse and messages produced by political contestation. 
From the feminist agenda, we are aware of the consciousness-raising tech-
niques and the development of the self, which are inconceivable outside a 
politically and symbolically structured social context. Post-communist dis-
cursive approaches and institutional practices related to the management of 
the Soviet past resemble the feminists’ aims to liberate an individual from a 
distorted identity formation (be it by the Soviet ghosts that permeate society 
or by male-dominated cultures). 
Several stories about the Soviet times are constructed and displayed by 
different political elite groups in post-communist Lithuania. There is no elite 
consensus on that matter even twenty years after the breakdown of commu-
nism. With the partial exception of conservative anti-nostalgic leaders (allied 
                                                     
9 On that account, obsession to ‘control the uncontrollable’, to exercise power in the 
domain of visual, the Lithuanian elites are perhaps unique in the post-communist 
region. The Law of political campaigning (adopted in June 2008) completely forbid-
ding political TV ads and allowing visual political publicity to be displayed only on 
specially designated public stands was revised and most of visual political campaign 
interdictions have been lifted since September 30, 2010. 
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with some populists), the Lithuanian political elite does not clearly cluster 
into any political clubs with coherent views towards Soviet practices, truths, 
and arts. The other political camps (social-democrats, liberals and populists) 
are much more internally divided and tend to display lukewarm attitudes 
towards the Soviet past and its political management. 
Our study does not permit us to empirically demonstrate that the homog-
enization of political elites’ attitudes has occurred over twenty years of the 
post-communist transition. However, the analysis of the adopted laws and 
public policies espoused, along with the results of the 2008 survey of politi-
cal elites’ attitudes with glances at the electoral debates of 2012, provide 
sufficient grounds for generalizing that anti-nostalgia and the negative as-
sessment of the Soviet experience is the dominant way of relating to the past 
in Lithuania. The social-democratic, liberal, and populist (however partial) 
initiatives and efforts to accommodate more permissive attitudes towards the 
Soviet past do not enjoy much resonance among the Lithuanian elite at large. 
 
List of party abbreviations used in the article 
 
TS — LKD — Homeland Union — Lithuanian Christian Democrats; 
LCP — Lithuanian Centre Party; 
JL — Young Lithania; 
DP — Labour Party; 
TPP — National Resurrection Party; 
TT — Order and Justice; 
LSDP — Social Democratic Party of Lithuania, 
LSDS — Lithuanian Social Democratic Union; 
LiCS — Liberal and Centre Union; 
LRLS — Liberal Movement; 
NS — New Union. 
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